Trade, development, and poverty-Induced comparative advantage by Maseland, R.K.J. & Vaal, A. de
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/68579
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
NiCE Working Paper 08-108 
September 2008
Trade, Development, and Poverty-Induced 
Comparative Advantage
Robbert Maseland 
Albert de Vaal
Nijmegen Center for Economics (NiCE) 
Institute for Management Research 
Radboud University Nijmegen
P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
http://www.ru.nl/nice/workingpapers
Trade, Development, and Poverty-Induced 
Comparative Advantage*
Robbert Maseland & Albert de Vaaly 
September 2008
Abstract
This paper deals with the relation between trade and development 
when poverty affects individual decision making. We develop a two- 
sector model that links production and schooling decisions under poverty 
with standard neo-classical trade analyses. The decision to either work 
or acquire skills depends on households having reached subsistence 
levels of income, implying that the income level of a country becomes 
important in establishing comparative advantages and trade patterns. 
Trade liberalisation is always allocative efficient, but its timing is im­
portant for the speed by which countries industrialise as well as for 
global efficiency. Our analysis support the idea that there are in­
stances that stalling trade liberalisation may serve poverty alleviation 
and global efficiency at the same time.
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1 Introduction
Ever since Adam Smith wrote his groundbreaking The Wealth of Nations, 
economists have debated the desirability of international trade. In this dis­
cussion, opponents have continuously brought in numerous specific cases in 
which free trade might not be desirable. Many of these convincing cases 
notwithstanding, this focus on exceptions has in a way only served to confirm 
the general rule that free trade is beneficial under ‘normal’ circumstances. 
With “the case for free trade (thus being) settled” in principle (Bhagwati 
et al., 1998), the economic debate has shifted towards specification of what 
circumstances could still count as normal.
A particularly persistent line of critique in this respect is that traditional 
trade theory has no attention for the specific problematic situation of devel­
oping societies. Being poor, lacking industrialisation and facing competition 
from economies in a much more advanced stage of development are not the 
normal circumstances for which the case for free trade has been settled. Ac­
cording to this argument, the poor need a special trade economics, as well 
as different policies than the liberal ones suggested by conventional trade 
theory. Such sentiments have fuelled protests at various WTO summits in 
recent years, and to some extent have contributed to the collapse of the cur­
rent Doha-round. Theoretically, these dissent voices have been propped up 
by economic historians and development economists claiming that late-comer 
development requires industrialization under government protection and sup­
port, before subjecting economic sectors to the discipline of the market (e.g. 
Amsden 1989; Wade 1990).
Regardless of whether one is willing to subscribe to this argumentation 
to abandon free trade policies for poor societies, the pervasiveness of the cri­
tique warrants economics to confront the argument and address the impact 
of poverty upon trade patterns. This paper aims at doing so. We develop 
a framework in which poverty co-determines comparative advantage, and 
use it to verify the desirability of trade in relation to issues like allocative 
efficiency and development. In particular, we develop a two-sector model 
that links production and schooling decisions under poverty with standard
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neo-classical trade analysis. The decision to either work in agriculture or 
to acquire skills needed for manufacturing is modelled to depend on house­
holds having reached a certain minimum, subsistence level of income. Apart 
from the influence of nature-given comparative advantages, also the income 
level of countries is then important in establishing comparative advantage. 
Over time, reductions in poverty might shift trade patterns and the verdict 
on the desirability of trade becomes dependent on the timing of trade lib­
eralisation as well as on the perspective taken. Our analysis suggests that 
whereas trade is always desirable if one focuses on short-term allocative effi­
ciency, temporary protection might be preferred because of dynamic effects 
on industrialization and development.
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 further motivates our 
set-up by discussing the potential impact of poverty on labour supply and 
production decisions on a micro-level, and trade and development on the 
macro-level. Section 3 subsequently constructs a formal model that takes 
these insights into account, which is used in Sections 4 and 5 to discuss the 
implications of including poverty over time for, respectively, the accumulation 
of training and comparative advantage. Section 6 discusses the desirability 
of trade in our poverty-ridden framework and Section 7 concludes.
2 W hy P overty  m atters
The critique on standard neo-classical models of international trade that 
they do not take into account the disadvantaged starting position of poor 
countries demands some clarification. Trade theory, and specifically compar­
ative advantage models, in fact do address the consequences of differences 
between countries engaging in international trade. Indeed, such differences 
are the prime source of trade and welfare gains in these models. However, 
differences between countries considered only apply to endowments or tech­
nology, and are treated as ’givens’ rather than as consequences of the level of 
development at a given time. The underlying assumption is that economic 
mechanisms apply universally, regardless of development level or context. In 
other words, comparative advantage models are not based upon micro-level
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analysis of specific consequences of making economic decision under condi­
tions of poverty.
The sub-discipline of development economics, however, gives arguments 
why economies might operate differently under poverty than under relative 
affluence. The literature about efficiency wages provides a good example (e.g. 
Dasgupta 1997). The implications of such work for trade theory are serious. 
If decision making under poverty differs from decision making under affluence, 
economic actions will be dependent upon outcomes of previous actions, and 
thus to some extent endogenous1. Hence, the behavioural assumptions on 
which standard trade models are founded in that case are too static and too 
simplistic to be instrumental for analysing the welfare effects of trade.
In order to come up with an alternative, a micro-analysis of the circum­
stances under which the poor produce is warranted. A main characteristic of 
situations of poverty is that individuals are directly confronted not with one, 
as in usual neoclassical theory, but with two budget constraints. On the one 
hand, it is impossible to consume more than one earns. On the other hand, 
it is impossible to consume less than a certain minimum needed for survival. 
This simple fact has important consequences for the labour supply decision 
of the individual, which are depicted in Figure 1.
[insert Figure 1 about here]
The figure depicts the decision of an individual confronted with the choice 
between work, resulting in income in the present, and training, resulting in 
higher wages in future. The U-curves represent iso-utility curves depicting all 
possible combinations of training and current income that yield the labourer 
the same level of utility. The slope of the curve in each point gives the 
marginal rate of substitution of current income and training in utility: the 
steeper the slope, the more the labourer values an additional unit of training.
1For example, efficiency wage theory shows th a t self-reinforcing income differences may 
occur between initially identical individuals (Dasgupta, 1997). A similar idea is endorsed 
by Sen who regards development as an increase in freedoms or entitlements (Sen, 1999). 
The corollary of this idea is th a t lack of development means a lack of freedoms and capa­
bilities, which will make decision making qualitatively different.
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She weighs this against the opportunity cost of training, which is the wage 
to be earned on the labour market. In the figure, this is represented by 
the slope of the budget lines wzLmax, for z =  A , B , C . These budget lines 
give, for each level of training that is physically possible (L < Lmax), the 
income level attainable at the prevailing wage rate. Normally, the optimising 
labourer will choose a ’consumption’ basket of training and income such that 
the marginal costs of training equal the marginal benefits, that is: where the 
budget line is tangent to the highest indifference curve possible. Point B and 
C indicate such points. Below the wage associated with point B, however, 
optimisation means to work until income reaches the level of consumption 
minimally required to sustain the household (the horizontal line Emin), while 
spending the rest of time on training. The low wage prevents the labourer 
from choosing the desired combination of training and work, resulting in a 
lower than desired rate of training. For instance, for wage Wa, the optimum 
choice would be A0, yet the labourer must choose A to stay at a subsistence 
level of income. In the presence of poverty, therefore, the training expansion 
path is depicted by the bold solid line in the figure. Up until point B, any rise 
in the wage rate will increase the possibilities for training, and, thereby the 
level of it. It is the room for training that determines how much labourers 
train, not their preferences. At wages above wB, however, they are not longer 
constrained by the need to survive and the level of training is determined 
by the normal marginal cost-benefit analysis. Under such conditions, the 
optimal level of training will be lower than upon subsistence, though at wage 
levels high enough training may increase again. This leads to the ’bend’ in 
the training expansion path .2
The relevance of this analysis is that for an individual constrained by 
poverty, it will be rational to limit labour supply once earnings go up, since 
more room is created to invest in training. This implies that, ironically
2T hat is, we implicitly assume th a t the wages just above subsistence are not high 
enough to  lead to  a situation in which higher wages lead to  a lowering of the number 
of hours worked. The latter phenomenon is a well-known possibility in the literature 
on labour markets, where it leads to  the backward bending part of the individual labour 
supply curve. Our assumption seems reasonable in light of the fact th a t backward bending 
supply curves are usually considered to  occur in situations of relative affluence.
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enough, the individuals earning the highest wages when supplying untrained 
labour will be the ones deciding to work least and train most. In other words, 
if training would yield the same higher income for all individuals, those with 
the least incentive to train will decide to train most. This only changes 
when wages rise above subsistence levels. Then standard neoclassical trade­
off decisions apply, giving rise to a negative relation between (current) wages 
and time devoted to training.
On a macro-level, this has important implications for the development 
of societies. If we take the development of society as a process of industri­
alisation coupled with increasing labour productivity, the level of training 
becomes central to the pace of economic growth. Training is required for 
untrained labour to engage in manufacturing and to become more produc­
tive. Therefore, a society in which more people devote more of their time to 
training instead of earning direct income will develop faster. If the amount 
of time devoted to training relates positively to current income, it follows 
that relatively affluent societies will develop a vaster stock of trained labour, 
fostering industrialisation. If such a country subsequently engages in trade 
with a poorer country that assigned less time to training, it will have de­
veloped a comparative advantage in manufacturing goods and export these 
goods accordingly.
The interesting aspect of this is that the comparative advantage in man­
ufactured goods arises precisely because the richer country was more pro­
ductive in the goods for which untrained labour was required. It follows 
because the inclusion of poverty in the analysis establishes a positive link 
between training levels and productivity and higher wages in agricultural 
sectors. Development and industrialisation are constrained by productivity 
in the agricultural sector, yielding fertile regions comparative advantages in 
manufactured goods and less fertile regions in agricultural goods. Accord­
ingly, trade patterns that occur are only indirectly based on nature-given 
circumstances. Poverty matters, for trade patterns and development.3
3This pattern  also has clear historical antecedents. Industrial and commercial centres 
typically emerged either at locations where the soil was fertile enough to  boost large 
populations not directly engaged in food production, or where particularly favorable water 
routes made it possible to  import food from other regions, such as the cases of Venice, the
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3 A  Formal M odel o f P overty  and Training
To verify the consequences of poverty-based training decisions at the house­
hold level on aggregate variables in a more formal manner, we model the 
economy of a potentially poor country as producing two goods by means of 
the production factors land and labour. The quantity and quality of land is 
fixed throughout the analysis. Labour, in contrast, is not homogeneous but 
consists of two qualities: trained and untrained labour. Initially, all labour is 
of the untrained quality but this can change over time as individuals might 
become trained. Untrained labour is an input to the production of a ho­
mogeneous, agricultural product F (from Food), which also takes land as an 
input. Trained labour is the sole production factor for producing a variety 
of manufactured goods M. Food is characterised by decreasing returns to 
scale (as the quantity of land is fixed over time, whereas the quantity of un­
trained labour is not). For the production of manufactured goods we assume 
increasing returns to scale at the firm level.
To formalise training decisions, we start by assuming that per period 
each individual has a certain amount of time available for working and/or 
training and we normalise this to one. This time is devoted to working (for 
trained individuals) or for working and/or training (for untrained individ­
uals). Next we assume that the decision how much to train is based on a 
comparison between current wages foregone and the net present value of the 
increment in wages that result from being trained, except when such amount 
of training would yield a wage income below subsistence. Then the time 
devoted to training is such that it allows individuals to survive, leaving them 
a subsistence level of income. Consequently, above subsistence the decision 
to become trained labour is based upon the desire for training. ’At subsis­
tence’ it is the room for training that determines time allotted to training. 
Finally, we must aggregate individual training levels. In our analysis being a 
trained or untrained individual is a dichotomous affair: one works either in 
the untrained agricultural sector or in the trained manufacturing sector. For 
aggregation, this would imply — given an initially homogeneous labour force
Black Sea and Holland (Cipolla 1980, 75-6).
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— that all labourers would devote the same time to training, simultaneously 
becoming trained enough to enter the manufacturing sector. This is not a 
very plausible way of aggregating individual decisions. Therefore, we first 
aggregate individual training activities and use that to determine how many 
trained individuals arise. One way to view this is that training efforts can be 
pooled within the agricultural sector, so that all individual training inputs 
combined result in a certain level of transformation. Untrained individuals 
see the importance of people becoming trained and are willing to sacrifice 
income in order for others to become trained. The amount of time devoted 
to training is thus actually what each individual decides to ’chip in’ for the 
common good of getting a trained labour force.
This set-up is made explicit by the following set of equations. The time 
individuals devote to training is governed by:
r  — w
T =  -------  (above subsistence) (1)
pw
T S =  (w — Emin)/w  (at subsistence) (2)
where T  denotes the share of time per period devoted to training, while 
w and r  denote wage rates for untrained and trained labour, respectively.4 
The superscript ’S ’ is used to distinguish training levels at subsistence. The 
parameter 0 < p < 1 denotes the individual’s time preference and Emin is 
the minimum subsistence level of expenditures. There are no tuition fees.
By choice of units, we set the total number of individuals in society equal 
to one. Denoting untrained individuals with L and trained individuals with
H , this implies that at any point of time:
H  +  L =  1. (3)
The transformation of individual training activities into trained individuals
4The expression features nominal wage rates, where real wage rates would be due. 
However, in (1), the price index drops out.
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is governed by:
Ht =  C • T • L (above subsistence) (4)
Ht =  C • T S • L (at subsistence)
That is, the total amount of time trained in society (T(S) • L) translates di­
rectly into trained individuals, while taking into account a training efficiency 
parameter C > 0. An increase in the efficiency parameter C implies that 
the training system becomes more efficient: a given input of hours training 
yields a higher 'o u tp u t'o f  trained individuals.
Essentially, (1) is the outcome of a cost-benefit calculation made by the 
untrained labourer, where she weighs the net present value of a persistent 
difference in wages (r—w)/p  against the costs of current wage income foregone 
due to (also) being engaged in training wT (which therefore cannot be used 
to work). It is relevant when individuals have a choice to optimally determine 
their training-work decision. In terms of Figure 1: when the curved part of 
the training expansion path applies.5 By contrast, (2) determines training 
levels such that the wage income that remains is just equal to the minimum 
level of expenditures required to survive: w(1 — T S) =  Emin. It is the room 
for training that determines how much individuals train, as on the flat part 
of the training expansion curve in Figure 1. Which of the two decision rules 
applies is determined by the model, as it will depend on the wage income 
untrained labour earns.
Since part of the untrained labourer's time is devoted to training, the 
amount of labour available for directly productive activities in the food sec­
tor is $  =  £(T) • L < L, with 0 < £(T) < 1 a declining function of the time 
devoted to training. We depict the amount by which training reduces effec­
tive labour input as a general function because training-while-working may 
affect labour input disproportianally. For instance, given that the untrained
5 The above subsistence training decision implies th a t individuals are myopic, perceiv­
ing current wage differentials to  persist forever. It can be shown, however, th a t (1) is 
also consistent with static forward-looking expectations (see Baldwin et al., 2003, Section 
2.B.4). Moreover, it is intuitively plausible: untrained labour bases its decision to  become 
trained or not on the profitability of doing so.
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labourer learns, this could positively affect the efficacy of labour input (even 
though the training does not directly apply to food production). By con­
trast, training may require more effort and energy than the hours devoted to 
it, decreasing labour input by more than the time it takes. In any case, we 
assume that the individual takes the value of £ as given, while in our analysis 
we will typically apply £ = 1  — T as a plausible benchmark. Once trained, 
individuals fully engage in directly productive activities, implying that H 
also denotes the amount of trained labour available for the manufacturing 
sector.
Wages of untrained labour are determined in de food sector. Food is 
produced by land and untrained labour and since the pile of arable land is 
given and fixed, its production entails decreasing returns. Specifically, we 
assume
F  =  A £  (5)
with 0 < ft < 1 indicating decreasing returns to scale and where A is a 
positive constant denoting fertility of land. Since food is a homogeneous 
product, we choose it as numeraire setting its price to one throughout the 
analysis (pF =  1). The wage income of untrained individuals is then equal 
to their marginal productivity:
w =  ftA£^_1. (6)
Trained labour is the sole production factor of manufactures. The manu­
facturing sector is monopolistically competitive and faces increasing returns 
to scale.6 Specifically, the production of a variety of the manufactured good 
requires f  units of trained labour to organise production —this is the fixed 
cost— and am units of trained labour for each unit of output produced — the 
marginal cost of production. Hence, the labour requirement of any manufac­
turing variety is: Hx =  f  +  amx.7 The costs of producing x  units of a variety
6 In modelling the manufacturing sector and the demand side of the economy, we follow 
standard practice in international trade modelling and modelling in the new economic 
geography literature. See e.g. Brakman et al. (2001) and Baldwin et al. (2003).
7 We ignore subscripts to  distinguish between varieties as each variety enters consumer 
demand symmetrically. Hence, equilibrium output, price and labour requirements will be
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thus equals r ( f  +  amx). Profit maximisation by manufacturing producers 
then implies that the price each producer charges is a fixed mark-up over 
marginal cost:
amr
p =  r r v a  <7)
Assuming free entry and exit in the manufacturing sector implies that profits 
will be driven to zero, so that, in equilibrium x =  f  (a — 1)/am and Hx =  a f . 
Since trained labour is only used in manufacturing, this implies that the 
total number of varieties in the economy is implicit in the full employment 
condition for trained labour:
H  =  NHx  =  N a f  (8)
Consumption is divided over food and the composite of manufactured 
goods in a Cobb-Douglas way, while the demand for varieties entails standard 
Dixit-Stiglitz love of variety. Denoting the total number of varieties available 
by N , we get:
U =  CM CjT" (9)
/ , N .1/(1-1/a)
Cm = ( J  c T 1/a dl)  (10)
where 0 < ^  < 1 denotes the expenditure share on manufactured goods and 
where a > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties as 
well as the price elasticity of demand. CM and CF denote, respectively, the 
consumption of the manufacturing composite and food. Utility maximisation 
implies that a share of the individual’s income is spent on manufactured 
goods and a share 1 — p on food.
All individuals divide their income over food and manufactures in the 
same way, irrespective of training and income levels.8 Accordingly, we can
the same across varieties.
8T hat is, we assume identical and homothetic preferences. Though perhaps unfitting 
for an analysis th a t centers around poverty as key determinant for decision making, we
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depict consumption levels as a function of aggregate income I  as follows:
CF =  (1 — p )I  and CM =  p i  (11)
Total income in the economy consists of what is earned in manufacturing 
and food production. Recalling that there are zero profits in manufacturing 
and assuming that rents (due to the presence of decreasing returns to scale 
in agriculture) are redistributed among the entire population9, we get:
I  =  rH  +  w £ /f t
All income is spent on food and manufactures. Wages foregone due to train­
ing are implicit in £ , while there are also no tuition fees.
In autarky, the ratio of total earnings in manufacturing and agriculture 
must equal the ratio of expenditure shares. Hence, equilibrium requires that:
r ( f  +  amx )N  =  p
A £  = 1  -  p ( )
where we used (11) to determine CM/C F. Substituting the equilibrium firm 
size in this equation and rearranging gives the wage rate for trained labour 
as a function of H :
r = __ p__ A £  (13)
(1 -  p) H  ( )
We are now in the position to determine the amount of training when the 
income of untrained labour is above subsistence. Substituting (6) and (13)
apply it to  maintain focus on the relation between poverty, training decisions and com­
parative advantage. Moreover, it keeps results tractable, for which reason homothetic 
preferences is also the standard assumption in trade theory. See, however, Matsuyama 
(2000) and Stibora and de Vaal (2007) for a treatm ent of nonhomothetic preferences in a 
trade theoretic framework.
9 The land rents are equal to  food production minus what is paid to  untrained labour, 
hence (1 — [ i)w £/[j . Our assumption th a t land rents are redistributed to  the whole pop­
ulation implies tha t initially, when all individuals are untrained, each untrained labourer 
is also owner of land and th a t this does not change when individuals become trained.
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in (1) yields,
t  = i [ _ l « t )  < i z H  _ 1I (14)
p [(1 -  p) ft H  J ( ;
In other words, above subsistence the amount an individual trains is a 
declining function of the amount of labour that has already been trained 
(dT /dH  < 0, taking £ as given). A rise in the share of trained labour10 
will cause a fall in the relative reward of trained labour. If untrained labour 
is removed, wages of untrained labour will rise due to decreasing returns to 
scale in agriculture. Furthermore, a higher share of trained labour means 
more manufacturing varieties, increasing competition and entailing a lower 
wage for trained labour. If the relative reward for trained labour falls, so 
does the desirability of undergoing training, and transformation slows down 
(d2T / d H 2 > 0). The amount of H  beyond which training is zero is given by 
H  = [(1- X k I  . For any H  < H  < 1 the wage premium of getting trained 
does not compensate for the loss of wage income foregone. We note that H  
is independent of A . The reason is that a higher fertility of land constitutes 
an exogenous boost of total incomes and expenditures in the economy, which 
are distributed over the economy according to relative expenditure shares on 
goods. Although agricultural incomes are higher because of higher quality 
land, manufacturing wages are also higher and the difference between the 
two remains the same.
At subsistence, it is the room for training that determines how much an 
individual trains, as given by (2). Applying the equilibrium wage rate for 
untrained labour, the amount of training is:
T S =  [ftA£^-1 -  Emin] / ftA £P -1 (15)
At subsistence, therefore, the time individuals devote to training increases 
with the share of trained labour in society, at an increasing rate (dTS/d H  > 
0, d2T S/d H 2 > 0 for given £). As transformation is based on the possibilities 
for training, training increases when the income of untrained labour rises, 
which is the case as more labour becomes trained. When the wage rate is
10 By (3), H  is also the share of trained labour in society.
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equal to the subsistence level of expenditures, the room for training is zero 
and individuals devote all their time to earn wage income. This is the case 
for any value of H  < H  =  1 _  (1/£) ' (Emin/ftA )1/(P 1). A positive level of 
training in the initial situation, when all labour is untrained and H  =  0, 
requires H  < 0 and hence (Emin/ftA )1/(P 1) > £. For the remainder of the 
analysis we assume that this is the case, so that also at H  =  0 we have 
nonnegative training levels.11
Figure 2 shows for either function the evolution of T  as a function of 
H  (the dashed curves). The exact position of the curves of course depends 
on the particular parameter values. For instance, the subsistence curve cuts 
the vertical axis at [1 — Emin/ftA£P_^ , which is nonnegative by assumption. 
The above subsistence curve always cuts the horizontal axis for H  < 1, as 
drawn. The true function of T  of course depends on which decision rule 
applies, to which we turn next.
[insert Figure 2 about here]
4 Training as tim e goes by
When the amount of trained labour in the economy increases, our model 
indicates that individual training levels increase when the economy is at 
subsistence, while training levels decrease when the economy is above sub­
sistence. Which situation applies is most easily determined by comparing 
the outcomes of training decisions under either regime. If T S > (<) T , then 
untrained labour is apparently above (at) subsistence as the room for train­
ing is equal or higher (lower) than the desired levels of training. In terms 
of Figure 2, the true function of T  would therefore be indicated by the bold 
curve.
The value of H  for which the regime switch occurs is implicit in:
(1 +  p)(1 -  H f - 1 =  +  T^ £(r (1 (16)
V J ftA£^-1 1 -  p ft H  V J
11Though technically feasible, it makes no sense to  allow for w =  E m¡n at positive levels 
of H  as then positive H  could never have been reached.
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It can be shown that H  is unique and that it always lies between zero and 
one.12 By applying the implicit function theorem it is easy to see that 
dH / dA < 0 and dH /dE min > 0. If land is more fertile or when subsis­
tence levels of expenditure are lower, there is more room for training and 
the economy reaches its above subsistence state faster. The extent by which 
training reduces effective labour supply in agriculture also has an impact. If 
£ goes up, it takes longer before the economy reaches the above subsistence 
state (dH/d£ > 0). A higher £ means that effective labour supply in food 
production goes up, implying a lower wage level for the untrained individual 
and less room for training.
The important point to be noted, however, is that the transition from 
one state to another is not as smooth as indicated in Figure 2. Individuals 
are myopic in the sense that they do not realise that their individual training 
decisions influence their wage rates. But since all individual behave alike, 
their individual decisions of course have macro implications. This is not 
problematic as long as training levels increase when H  goes up, as is the 
case when the economy is at subsistence. Higher training levels imply that 
the marginal productivity in agriculture goes up, which is reinforced by a 
lower number of untrained labourers. This increases the room for training, 
wages rise, et cetera. When the economy is above subsistence, however, 
training levels decrease sharply in H  (see Figure 2) and wages will drop even 
though H  increases. This implies that when the economy moves from the 
’at subsistence’ to the ’above subsistence’ state, the wage drop may be such 
that the economy immediately switches back to ’at subsistence’ again. With 
the room for training once more determining training levels, wages rise and 
another regime switch occurs, et cetera, et cetera.
To see the macro implications of individual training decisions more clearly, 
we depict the true path of training as a function of H  in Figure 3 (solid curve), 
along with the T s and T  curves (dashed). The figure is based on numerical 
calculations that are based on the following parameter values: A  =  4, Emin =
12The left-hand-side of (16) is a positive function of H , ranging from (1 +  p) at H  =  0 
to  infinite at H  =  1. The right-hand-side of the equation is a negative function of H  and 
ranges from infinite at H  =  0 to  pEmin/fiACt^~ 1 >  0 at H  =  l.Hence, both functions 
intersect a t H  <  1.
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1.75, p =  ft =  0.6, p =  0.9, C =  0.1, am =  0.5 and f  =  1 , increasing H  from 
zero and one with 0.01 increments.13 Moreover, we set £(T ) equal to 1 — T . 
To operationalise myopic behaviour, we assume that optimal training levels 
for a certain value of H  depend on the wages of the previous value of H . 
Indeed, since H  accumulates over time and we do not allow for distraining
— once untrained labour is trained there is no way back — lower values of H  
indicate earlier moments in time. Hence, in the figure Tt =  [(r/w) t- 1  — 1] /p  
and T S =  1 -  Em in/w ^.
[insert Figure 3 about here]
The figure clearly shows oscillations around the switching point, which 
dampen when H  increases. The dampening occurs because the trend in 
desired training levels is going down when H  increases, to eventually become 
zero. At the same time, the room for training eventually goes up again, 
implying that from some point onwards desired levels determine training 
levels. The figure also shows that the first part of the subsistence curve 
increases rapidly at low levels of H , returning to a steady slope thereafter 
(disregarding the oscillations). This is simply a ’beginning of time’ effect. 
At time zero, training levels increase from zero to a positive but finite level, 
increasing wages considerably. This continues for a while, until the changes 
in training levels and wages over time normalise.
The oscillations could be easily avoided by assuming that individuals do 
not change training levels over time that lightly. If, for instance, we would 
assume that the change in training levels depends on past wages through:
r -  w . _  , 
-  Tt-i)
w ' t-i
(17)
and if we would choose 0 < 5 < 1 low enough, the oscillations disappear 
and the figure becomes smooth as depicted in Figure 2. The plausibility 
of such a procedure depends on how one interprets a time period. In our
13 The basic form of the figure is invariant to  alterations in any of these parameters, 
provided of course th a t training levels are positive at H  =  0.
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set-up trained individuals arise as the result of pooled individual training 
decisions. In that case it seems plausible to see each period as a moment 
in time when a new generation of individuals decides how much to set aside 
for training. Training in each period then concerns different individuals and 
large swings in training levels across periods are not unlikely. We will pursue 
this interpretation henceforth.
The accumulation of H  over time is based on an aggregation of individual 
training levels. Using (4), we get
C ■ Lt ■ Tt =  C (1 _  Ht) d ^ u) ~  1 (above subsistence)(l-M) PH
C\f3A((.)P~1(1 -  Ht)P -  (1 -  Ht)EmJ
C ■ L t ■ T f  =  ------------^ ( )g_1 ( l _  n j g - l ------------  (at subsistence)
(18)
with a dot denoting a time derivative. The subscript t is added to signify 
that training decisions depend on the amount of trained individuals at a 
particular moment in time. The particular curvatures of both curves are as 
follows (omitting time subscripts):
A t subsistence
d k / d H  C [(2 -  ft)Emin -  w]/w ?  0 
d2H /d H 2 (2 -  ft) C Emin (ft -  1)/w(1 -  H ) < 0
Above subsistence
(  T  1 1 \
d H /dH  —C I T  < 0 if T >  0
V H  P H  )
\ 1 (  K (.) r 1 sT  + -  1 +  p sw  (1 +---- )
_ +  p \  +  p (1 -  p ) ( +  H )
d2H /d H 2 C / H 2 > 0 if T >  0
Above subsistence, trained labour accumulates over time as long as the level 
of training is positive, that is when H  < H . The rate of accumulation 
decreases when time proceeds. At subsistence, the accumulation of trained 
labour increases over time as long as w < (2 — P)Emin. Hence, whereas 
Tf  increases in H , aggregate training levels might decrease in H . This is a 
logical outcome of aggregation. While the room for training increases, the 
number of individuals it applies to reduces.
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Ultimately the accumulation of trained labour stops, which we will refer 
to as the economy’s steady state. Since untrained labour always gets above 
subsistence at some level of H  < 1 —if H  !  1, w goes to infinity— it follows 
that the steady state level of H  is determined by setting C • (1 — Ht) • Tt =  0. 
By (18) we calculate that the economy reaches a steady state a t:14
H  = _____p£ (T)_____  (19)
(1 -  p)ft +  p£ (T ) ( )
which indeed coincides with the threshold level H  beyond which individual 
training levels are zero. We note that the steady state level of H  is indepen­
dent of A, the fertility of land.
The oscillation patterns that affected individual training levels when H  
progressed also influence the accumulation of trained labour. Figure 4 de­
picts the development of H  over time for the parameter constellation we used 
before, for alternative values of ft and A .15 For low values of ft the accumula­
tion of H  increases at first, then decreases and ultimately becomes zero. For 
higher values of ft, the decline sets in much faster. Changes in the value of A  
affect the position of the H -curve, but not its pattern. Also the time it takes 
before the continuous regime switches end does not change. Higher fertility 
of land implies that the curves shift upwards, while rotating counterclock­
wise. Initial training levels are higher and subsistence levels of income are 
reached at an earlier stage. The oscillations would disappear once changes 
in T  are smoothened over time, as in (17) and provided the adjustment rate 
is low enough.16 The fact that H  ultimately reaches zero is consistent with
14We note th a t a second steady state equilibrium exists, which occurs when even at 
H  =  0 wages are at subsistence. Then w — Em¡n =  0 also implies a positive steady state 
level of H . It is however immediately clear th a t this is a theoretical possibility only, as 
supposedly any economy has started at some point in time without any amount of trained 
labour (hence positive H  could never have been reached). The limiting case when w — E min 
=  0 at H  =  0 is possible though, but highly unstable. Any rise in H  leads to  an upward 
spiral until income is above subsistence level and, subsequently, the stable steady state 
equilibrium is reached.
15 In contrast to  Figure 3 the horizontal axis exhibits constant increments in time and 
not in H . All values of H  were calculated by using the actual amount of H  in the previous 
period.
16 The smoothness of H  also disappears if the effectivity C  by which training transforms
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the constant steady state level of H .
[insert Figure 4 about here]
5 P overty-induced  C om parative A dvantage
In this section we uses our model to verify the implications of poverty on 
comparative advantage. We assume that the world consists of two regions, 
North and South, that are initially exactly similar, except that North has 
more fertile land at its disposal than South. Using asterisks to denote south­
ern variables, A > A* throughout the analysis.
In our model, comparative advantage is given by the relative price of 
manufactures over food. W ith food being numeraire, the relative price of 
manufactured goods is given by (7). Using (13) to substitute for r, we get:
_  amA p a Ç( T f  (1 -  H 'f  
P (1 -  p) a -  1 H  ( )
as the relative price of manufactures in North. The relative price of man­
ufactures increases when the share of manufacturing in total expenditures 
increases (p), when the marginal labour costs of manufacturing production 
goes up (am) and when the monopoly power of manufacturing producers 
increases (as implied by a lower price elasticity of demand a). The rela­
tive price of manufactures also increases when the fertility of land A  goes 
up. Likewise, (20) implies that the relative price of manufactures goes down 
when H  increases (dp/dH < 0) and when the effective labour input into food 
production goes down (£(T) down).
For the South an isomorphic equation applies for p*. The comparative ad­
vantage of both countries is given by p /p*. If p/p* > (<) 1, we say that North 
has a comparative advantage in food (manufactures). If the two countries
individuals into trained labour appraoches one. The reduction in untrained labour as well 
as the reduction in desirability of getting trained during the first period is so large th a t the 
economy immediately swithches to  the above subsistence state and remains there forever.
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are completely identical, except for the fertility of land, we get:
C (T) • (1 -  H )p =  A H  * 
p* A* H C(T*) • (1 -  H*)
( 2 1 )
where we have implemented p =  p*, a =  a* and am =  a*m. For equal train­
ing levels and trained labour stocks, South’s comparative advantage lies in 
manufacturing. The less fertile soil in South puts it at a disadvantage in 
producing food compared to the North. This will be for instance the case 
when neither of the countries has trained labour, as in the initial situation. 
However, differences in soil fertility also imply that South and North face 
different time paths for the accumulation of trained labour. In terms of Fig­
ure 4: the upper (lower) curve would be North’s (South’s). W ith H  and T  
increasing more rapidly in North than in South, p/p* increases and compar­
ative advantage shifts. More specifically, when A£@/H < A* £  @/H*, the 
South acquires a comparative advantage in food instead of manufacturing. 
Note that in our framework average food production (per unit of trained 
labour) indicates (revealed) comparative advantage of nations.
Due to poverty and its effects on training decisions, an initial comparative 
advantage in manufacturing becomes a disadvantage, setting nations behind 
in their transformation from mainly agriculture based societies to industri­
alised societies. This clearly contrasts to standard treatments of comparative 
advantage, where comparative advantage is typically taken as given. Also in 
comparison to the dynamic comparative advantage literature17, the mecha­
nism we offer is completely different. As of yet, comparative advantage has 
not been linked to decision making under poverty at all.
To see more clearly how poverty determines comparative advantage, we 
verify the conditions under which comparative advantage shifts when coun­
tries start at equal, initial amounts of trained labour (H =  H *) and concomi-
17 The literature on endogenous comparative advantage tries to  explain how comparative 
advantages evolve when there are no inherent differences between agents, see Yang and Ng 
(1998) for an overview. In addition, the relation between exogenous comparative advantage 
and endogenous comparative advantage has received attention, for instance by establishing 
conditions under which initial exogenous comparative advantages may change. An early 
and seminal contribution is Yang (1994).
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tant individual training levels (so that C(T) =  C(T*)). If countries are both 
above subsistence level, then also the accumulation of trained labour is the 
same. Above subsistence, training decisions are independent of A , see (14). 
H  and H * follow identical paths over time, leaving comparative advantage 
unchanged. If, however, both countries are at subsistence, things change dra­
matically. When the initial amount of trained labour is equal, say close to 
zero, the room for training is higher in the North. Accumulation of trained 
labour goes faster in the North than in the South, declining North’s relative 
price of manufactures. In fact, it can be shown that comparative advantage 
will shift in the first period that training occurs (so in period one).18 Having 
more fertile land implies a comparative advantage in manufactures at the 
beginning of the first period after which training could occur.
We illustrate the development of comparative advantage over time for 
two different values of ft in Figure 5, again using our benchmark parameter 
constellation. As expected, comparative advantage shifts right away, to even­
tually return to its nature given ordering. The reasoning is as before. In the 
initial situation, where both countries have zero trained labour, the room for 
training is higher in the North. H  accumulates faster than H *, shifting initial 
comparative advantages. North however also reaches the point where income 
gets above subsistence faster, declining the incentive for training (while in 
the South the room for training still increases). Consequently, from that 
point onward p /p* will go up again. This continues when South surpasses 
its subsistence level of income. In both countries the price of manufactures 
falls, but as South is further away from steady state, prices in South fall 
more rapidly than in the North. As both countries reach the same steady 
state — H  is independent of A  — eventually comparative advantage retains 
its initial ordering again.
The overall picture is invariant to the value ft. A lower value of ft shifts the
18During period 1 training levels are [1 — E min/^A] for North and [1 — Em-ln/pA*]  for 
South, amounting to  H  =  C [1 — Em;n/^A] and H * =  C [1 — E m;n/^A*] at the beginning 
of period 2. Using this in (21) and assuming C(T) =  1 — T  and C(T *) =  1 — T *, shows 
th a t the relative price of manufactures in period 2 is smaller than  A / A * (which was the 
initial relative price). Taking the derivative of the relative price with respect to  A  and 
evaluating it for A =  A*, yields d (p/p*) /d A  < 0. Hence, during period 1, p/p* falls and 
becomes lower than  one.
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curve downward and prolongs the time it takes for South to retain its nature 
given comparative advantage in manufactures. The reason is simple and in 
line with our earlier results. A lower value of ft implies higher decreasing 
returns in food production, which amplifies the positive impact of training 
on wages. W ith training levels at subsistence higher in North, the wage 
difference between North and South increases and so does H  accumulation 
over time (cf. Figure 4). This also explains the difference in amplitude of 
the oscillations that appear in the figure. With lower decreasing returns, the 
time paths of trained labour accumulation converge and oscillation periods 
overlap. The wage and price shocks that occur in both countries therefore 
either reinforce or counter each other, affecting the amplitude of the swings 
in comparative advantage accordingly.
[insert Figure 5 about here]
The overall picture is also invariant to allowing for depreciation of trained 
labour. Arguably, skills acquired during training may wear out over time, 
implying that trained labour may become unsuitable for producing manufac­
tures after a while. However, allowing for this possibility in our framework, 
for instance by assuming that each period a certain percentage of the total 
trained labour force becomes untrained again, does not affect the analysis 
whatsoever. This is different when we allow for other increases in the un­
trained labour force, for instance exogenous population growth. Provided the 
(exogenous) untrained labour force growth exceeds the (endogenous) outflow 
into trained labour, a country may remain at subsistence forever. The reason 
is of course that since the number of people working in agriculture does not 
decline, wages for untrained labour are depressed, which mitigates the room 
for training and depresses wages even further.19 In our analysis it is more 
likely that the less fertile country remains at subsistence -  the pressure on
19 In the end this must imply th a t the room for training becomes negative, so that 
untrained labour gets under subsistence. This opens the door to  endogenous population 
growth —some people will starve to  death— but we will not consider this option.
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wages in agriculture is initially highest there. In that case also its compara­
tive advantage will remain in agricultural produce forever. In terms of Figure 
5: the upward sloping part disappears.20
6 Trade, poverty and developm ent
In this section we discuss the consequences of our framework on the desirabil­
ity of trade liberalisation in the wake of poverty. As shown, poverty affects 
the development of countries, affecting their comparative advantages over 
time. The effects of trade liberalisation therefore depend on the time it takes 
place. We start with discussing the impact of trade development
Starting with allocative efficiency, it is clear that trade is beneficial for 
both countries: the overall gains from trade are invariant to the reason for 
comparative advantage. However, it might be that global efficiency is served 
by preventing poverty to affect comparative advantage and trade patterns. 
To see this, we note that the switch away from nature-given comparative 
advantage is not efficient compared to a world where this switch had not oc­
curred. A conceivable alternative world in which the infertile country devel­
ops a larger industrial base and the fertile country specializes in agriculture, 
clearly would be able to achieve higher global output in both agricultural 
and manufactured goods. Food production taking place in fertile regions 
means that the world is able to harbor a higher share of trained workers, so 
that the number of manufacturing companies increase, bringing down costs 
of manufactures. In other words, given the circumstances there are advan­
tages in terms of allocative efficiency, but opening up to trade also affects 
the circumstances. Whether this is for the good depends on the timing of 
trade liberalization. Trade could help creating an alternative distribution 
of endowments that is more efficient, but it is also possible that trade de­
lays or prevents reaching the most efficient distribution of endowments. How
20This holds when the population growth rates in both countries are not too far apart. 
Only when the more fertile North also reaches steady state at subsistence levels of income, 
while having a population growth rate exceeding th a t of South considerably, will the 
upward sloping part reappear.
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this works will become clear after discussing how trade affects comparative 
advantage and how this depends on the timing of trade liberalisation.
Comparative advantage changes with the development phase of a country. 
Initially, North has a comparative advantage in agricultural products, which 
is in line with its nature-given comparative advantage. Due to North’s faster 
industrialisation, however, its comparative advantage immediately shifts into 
manufacturing once training enters the analysis. In steady state though, 
North’s comparative advantage is in food again. Qualitatively, trade does 
not affect this development pattern. Regardless of whether trade does or 
does not take place, the steady state, in which no more labour is trained, is 
always the same, determined by internal factors only.21 In the (very) long 
run, therefore, trade has no impact upon development and, for that matter, 
the endowment distribution.
However, this does by no means imply that trade is irrelevant. Trade 
affects the income distribution and, by that, influences the speed of devel­
opment of countries. How exactly depends on the moment that trade liber­
alisation occurs. It turns out that the important distinction for developing 
an industrial base is between (1) liberalisation occurring before the southern 
region has achieved subsistence levels of income, (2) liberalisation occurring 
after the southern region has achieved subsistence levels of income, but with 
still a comparative advantage in agricultural goods, and (3) liberalisation 
occurring after the southern region has achieved subsistence levels of income 
and has returned to its nature-given comparative advantage in manufactured 
goods.
If trade occurs before the southern region has achieved subsistence levels 
of income (phase 1), it will tend to speed up the industrialisation processes 
sketched in the previous section. For this to take place it does not matter 
when exactly during phase 1 trade is liberalised. Suppose, for instance, that 
there is free trade right from the start. Then North will start exporting agri­
cultural products and import industrial goods (and opposite for South)22.
21 Specifically, the relative consumption shares of agricultural and manufactures products 
and the degree of economies of scale in the agricultural sector.
22To be precise, both countries are either a net importer or net exporter of manufactures,
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However, comparative advantages will immediately shift and North acquires 
a comparative advantage in manufacturing. If trade remains liberalised, 
South’s comparative advantage in agriculture implies that that sector starts 
to gain from trade. This accelerates training and South starts to catch up. 
If this takes place before South has reached the subsistence threshold, trade 
thus increases the rate of industrialisation in South. By contrast, in North it 
will lower the rate of industrialisation, as long as North is still at subsistence. 
During phase 1, therefore, trade counters poverty-induced specialisation pat­
terns and supports the restoration of nature-given comparative advantages.
Once both countries reach subsistence levels of income, the impact of 
trade becomes different. Now, the desirability rather than the room for 
training governs training decisions. Were South still to have a compara­
tive advantage in agricultural goods (phase 2), then trade tends to augment 
southern incomes in this sector, while depressing incomes in manufactur­
ing. As a result training becomes less attractive. In North the opposite 
occurs: training is supported as trade boosts (lowers) incomes in manufac­
turing (agriculture). The overall effect is that trade supports poverty-induced 
specialisation patterns, delaying the shift back to nature-given comparative 
advantages. North reaches its steady state earlier because of trade, while for 
South it takes longer.23
However, the opposite occurs when trade is liberalised when both coun­
tries are above subsistence, yet comparative advantages are in line with their 
nature-given positions (phase 3). Now North, confronted with lower manu­
facturing and higher agricultural wages because of trade, will experience a 
decrease in the rate of training. In South, on the other hand, the manufac­
turing sector benefits from trade so that training becomes more attractive, 
speeding up industrialisation. In other words, trade supports specialisation 
in line with nature-given comparative advantages.24
as trade in manufactures will be of the intra-industry type. Hence, when we speak of 
specialization in production, we actually mean relative specialization.
23 Note th a t due to  differences in fertility, comparative advantage will shift before the 
process of catching up is completed.
24This also holds true for the situation where North is above subsistence and South at 
subsistence levels of income, while South has a comparative advantage in agriculture. In 
th a t case, trade liberalisation increases training levels in both countries, boosting devel­
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For the desirability of trade liberalisation, this has important implica­
tions. First, we note that ultimate outcomes of development are not affected 
by trade, so that these do not enter the evaluation of trade liberalisation. In 
other words, there are no strict ’lock-in’ effects. Even if we would allow for 
exogenous population growth, with South’s comparative advantage remain­
ing in agriculture forever, trade is not the reason for lock-in effects.25 What 
trade can do, however, is to affect the moment these ultimate, steady-state 
outcomes are achieved, either delaying it or advancing it. Second, we note 
that the analysis lends some to the idea that global efficiency might be served 
by stalling trade liberalisation. Returning to our earlier point on allocative 
efficiency: while efficient in terms of allocation of production and consump­
tion, trade may not be efficient regarding the distribution of endowments. 
Stalling trade during intermediate phase 2 would have the benefit that it 
brings the world closer to the situation where nature-given comparative ad­
vantages rather than poverty determine specialisation and trade patterns.26
The implications of trade liberalisation on industrial development are 
summarised in Table 1. Consider the southern, less fertile region, then trade 
is certainly supportive of industrialisation in phase 1. Boosting agricultural 
incomes, trade increases the room for training and industrialisation can oc­
cur at a higher pace. Trade negatively affects industrialisation objectives, 
however, once South has reached subsistence levels of income but still has 
a poverty-induced comparative advantage in agricultural goods. It is only 
after comparative advantages have shifted back to their nature-given posi­
tions that trade becomes supportive of industrialisation again. For North the 
implications are exactly opposite.
opment in North and South.
25In fact, with population growth, trade may help South to  escape subsistence levels of 
income, as it increases the room for training.
26 This seems to  ignore any costs th a t could be involved in shifting from the poverty- 
induced to  the nature-given state. As it can be argued th a t individuals would weigh 
these costs against the benefits of structural transformation in their training decisions, 
including such costs would render the argument favouring tem porary protection null and 
void. However, price-taking individuals do not take into account the effects of training that 
occur via changed global endowment distributions and specialization pattern. Individuals 
not taking into account these effects train  less than  the optimal amount from a social 
perspective.
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Table 1: E ffects o f  trad e on  th e  pace o f  industria l d evelopm ent
North South
Phase 1: at subsistence negative positive
Phase 2: above subsistence; poverty 
induced comparative advantage positive negative
Phase 3: above subsistence; nature-given 
comparative advantage negative positive
From the point of view of industrialisation and endowment distribution, 
therefore, our analysis implies that trade is beneficial to the poorest countries, 
but might be forgone by middle-income countries in the process of catching- 
up. Choosing not to open up to trade could accelerate development for 
these countries.27 However, what is also clear from Table 1 is that when 
industrialisation is at stake, trade liberalisation tends to be a zero-sum game, 
at least until steady states have been achieved. Whenever North benefits 
from trade, South does not and vice versa. The only exception occurs in the 
intermediate phase that is not exhibited in the table, when North has reached 
subsistence levels, while South has not. In that case, trade is temporarily 
positive for both countries (see footnote 24).
7 C onclusion
This paper has argued that poverty is a crucial factor in assessing the desir­
ability of trade liberalisation for development. The basic argument we have
27We only use trade policy as intervention option for illustrative purposes. Other forms 
of intervention might of course be preferable to  trade policy, but it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to  assess which policy constitutes a first- or second-best intervention to  the 
problems we perceive.
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put forward is that poverty limits people in their economic choices. Con­
fronted with a wage that is hardly sufficient to survive, people are forced to 
supply all the labour time necessary for reaching a subsistence income. In 
this sense, deciding on one’s labour inputs on basis of their preferences about 
various alternative uses of available time is a luxury that poor people cannot 
afford.
The main effect of this observation is that in a context of poverty, higher 
wages will tend to limit labour supply and boost alternative uses of time, 
such as schooling. It follows that countries whose population enjoys higher 
agricultural incomes will be able to invest more in training, and therefore 
develop faster. These aspects of poverty have been analysed in a formal set-up 
that takes heed of these non-standard decision processes. It has been shown 
that countries enjoying a nature-given comparative advantage in agriculture, 
for instance because of higher fertility of land, will develop a poverty-induced 
comparative advantage in manufacturing. Over time, however, as incomes 
rise and industrialisation takes hold in less advantaged regions as well, this 
pattern of comparative advantage will shift back again to its nature-given 
position.
Trade has no qualitative effect on these processes, but may either prolong 
or compress the period of poverty-induced comparative advantages. Depen­
dent on the specific phase of relative development of a country, it might be 
desirable to pass by on trade if one’s goal is to industrialise as soon as pos­
sible. Our paper therefore supports the critique that poverty disqualifies the 
standard reasoning (in economics) that free trade is typically good. Poverty 
has been shown to matter, for both development and the resultant emergence 
of trade patterns. Dependent on the importance one attaches to dynamic in­
come effects, a temporary phase of protection might therefore be desirable 
for developing countries. Such temporary protectionist measures are however 
not benefiting the poorest countries. Opposition to free trade is principally 
in the interest of middle-income countries in the process of catching-up. This 
puts the collapse of trade talks in Cancun in a rather different light, since the 
opposing block of developing nations was led by precisely such middle-income 
countries. In terms of poverty alleviation, then, free trade is still optimal.
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In the end, of course, the income effects of various policy alternatives 
need to be compared to assess the relevance and desirability of policy inter­
vention. We have not addressed this issue explicitly, but note that whereas 
industrialisation raises incomes in the long(er) run, trade always brings direct 
beneficial effects, in terms of increased static allocative efficiency. In other 
words, the decision whether to open up to trade or not for a middle-income 
country while catching-up hinges on its particular trade-off between direct 
income effects and the desired speed of industrialisation. If a country puts 
a stronger emphasis on current income, trade is always beneficial. If, by 
contrast, a country is willing to sacrifice current gains from trade to achieve 
higher levels of income in future sooner, stalling free trade could be optimal. 
For instance when trade liberalisation would prolong the state where poverty- 
induced comparative advantage pattern governs trade patterns. Because of 
poverty, countries seeking fast industrialisation and a rapid dissemination of 
dynamic income effects may want to temporarily stall the free movement of 
goods until comparative advantage has resumed its nature-given order.
If other countries have the same objective, conflicts of interest are likely 
to emerge. One might suspect that trade liberalisation becomes a very dif­
ficult exercise for this reason. On the other hand, also global efficiency 
may be served by stalling free trade. Global income levels will be high­
est when natural endowments determine comparative advantage and not 
poverty. In a world where poverty matters, our analysis shows that there 
are instances where postponing trade liberalisation may serve poverty allevi­
ation and global efficiency at the same time.
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